![]() There is a primacy of the idea over the affect for the very simple reason that in order to love it's necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however indeterminate it may be, of what is loved. He thereby immediately infers a primacy of the idea over the affect, and this is common to the whole 17th century, so we have not yet entered into what is specific to Spinoza. A volition, a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-representational mode of thought. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing.Įvery mode of thought insofar as it is non-representational will be termed affect. So what does that mean? Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, this is not representational. This already gives us a first point of departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) because we call affect any mode of thought which doesn't represent anything. Thus we start from a quite simple thing: the idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational character. It is the relation of the idea to the object that it represents. The idea, insofar as it represents something, is said to have an objective reality. ![]() Still from the terminological point of view, it's quite useful to know that since the Middle Ages this aspect of the idea has been termed its “objective reality.” In texts from the 17th century and earlier, when you encounter the objective reality of the idea this always means the idea envisioned as representation of something. For example, the idea of a triangle is the mode of thought which represents the triangle. What is called an idea, in the sense in which everyone has always taken it in the history of philosophy, is a mode of thought which represents something. Some translators translate affectio as “affection” and affectus as “feeling”, which is better than translating both by the same word, but I don't see the necessity of having recourse to the word “feeling” since French offers the word “affect.” Thus when I use the word “affect” it refers to Spinoza's affectus, and when I say the word “affection,” it refers to affectio.įirst point: what is an idea? What must an idea be, in order for us to comprehend even Spinoza's simplest propositions? On this point Spinoza is not original, he is going to take the word “idea” in the sense in which everyone has always taken it. They translate both terms, affectio and affectus, by “affection.” I call this a disaster because when a philosopher employs two words, it's because in principle he has reason to, especially when French easily gives us two words which correspond rigorously to affectio and affectus, that is “affection” for affectio and “affect” for affectus. Some translators, quite strangely, translate both in the same way. ![]() In Spinoza's principal book, which is called the Ethics and which is written in Latin, one finds two words: AFFECTIO and AFFECTUS. I begin with some terminological cautions. It matters little whether you've read him or not, for I'm telling a story. I believe that, of all the philosophers of whom the history of philosophy speaks to us, Spinoza is in a quite exceptional situation: the way he touches those who enter into his books has no equivalent. I assume that the room is relatively mixed. I will begin chiefly with terminological remarks. After all, a philosopher is not only someone who invents notions, he also perhaps invents ways of perceiving. I would almost like for you to take this bit of history of philosophy as a history tout court. During March, at the request of some of you, we will also take a break to consider the problem of synthesis and the problem of time in Kant.įor me, this produces a curious effect of returning to history. This very precise point concerns the following: what is an idea and what is an affect in Spinoza? Idea and affect in Spinoza. ![]() It's like a break, at the request of some of you. Today we pause in our work on continuous variation to return temporarily, for one session, to the history of philosophy, on a very precise point.
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